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Introduction
1 
 
CARICOM
2 countries are facing a continuously expanding programme of trade 
negotiations at the regional, hemispheric and global levels. Briefly, these negotiations 
cover the WTO (Built-in Agenda, Doha Development Round, and possibly “Millennium 
Round”), CARICOM (CSME Programme), FTAA, and ACP/European Union. Other 
possible negotiations could involve CARICOM/Cuba (phase two), CARICOM/Andean 
Group, CARICOM/Central America and CARICOM/Canada. Priority in these 
negotiations is obviously going to post-Cotonou, WTO and FTAA. The WTO  is 
important as it governs both the FTAA and the future ACP/EU arrangement. Post-
Cotonou and FTAA would also reflect the importance of preserving existing markets as 
well as market prospects for exports. Caribbean trade is intricately linked to key markets 
such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. Developments in these 
markets, in so far as they potentially can be trade-diverting are of particular significance 
to these countries. 
 
Regional negotiations also occupy a strategic position among the negotiating 
priorities. Essentially they seek to consolidate the CARICOM market as well as extend 
the regional market to neighbouring countries, particularly for new and non-traditional 
manufactures and services. 
 
CARICOM perceives the present and future set of negotiations as important in 
assisting them in making a transition to a more competitive global environment. They 
accept that trade preferences are on their way out but plead for a reasonable period of 
adjustment for these small economies that are vulnerable to rapid changes in prices, 
environmental hazards, etc. They believe that there should be some understanding on the 
part of the international community to the plight of small economies. Trade strategies are 
therefore linked to the vulnerability of small states, the UN SIDS programme and Agenda 
21 and poverty reduction strategies, and are largely formulated in terms of special and 
differential treatment.  
 
 Paper presented at a Symposium entitled “The European Union: A Polity in Transformation ,and a Model 
for Transition in the Americas” and organized by the Miami European Union Center and  the Jean Monnet 
Chair in cooperation with  the Dante Fascell North-South Center,  University of Miami, April 3-7, 2002. 
1 See Appendix for a list of abbreviations. 
2 CARICOM members are Antigua And Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, 
Guyana,  Jamaica, Montserrat, St Kitts/Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and The Grenadines, Suriname, 
Trinidad And Tobago. The Bahamas is an Associate Member but not a member of the Common Market. 
Haiti is a provisional member. Ratification of the Agreement by the Haitian Parliament is awaited.  
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In these complex and broad negotiations, the question of reciprocity remains a 
central preoccupation in external trade policy formulation in the region. So far, 
CARICOM countries have agreed to an approach that emphasizes reciprocity by the 
CARICOM MDCs and non-reciprocity for the CARICOM LDCs. This has already been 
put into practice in the trade agreements with Colombia, the Dominican Republic and 
Cuba. 
 
As regards developed countries this position is still to be tested. There are 
demands in the FTAA and in the European Union for reciprocity that would have to be 
addressed. An extensive debate has been raging in terms of approaches and modalities to 
granting reciprocity to developed countries. In this paper, the aim is to assess the chances 
of success of the CARICOM strategy with respect to the European Union.  The 
CARICOM approach is first examined as it has been applied in this region. Its experience 
in the WTO and FTAA is then discussed as an input into the appraisal of its possibilities 
in the ACP/EU context. 
 
 
CARICOM’s Approach to External Trade Negotiations 
 
As a trade strategy, CARICOM at the outset adopted a notion of ever widening 
concentric circles in terms of increasing levels of competition. The West Indian 
Commission
3 which best articulates this position grappled with the twin problem of 
widening and deepening of CARICOM in the new post-cold war era. It resolved this 
dilemma by arguing that CARICOM, due to its small size, should remain as a separate 
integration scheme and collectively negotiate with large Caribbean and Latin American 
countries. At the time, countries such as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Cuba and 
Venezuela were considered as large and potentially having too great an influence on the 
movement. Their economic and social structures were also seen as different and capable 
of weakening the already fragile coherence of CARICOM. Suriname and the small 
Caribbean overseas territories and dependencies were regarded as potential members of 
CARICOM that would satisfy the criteria of smallness. The signing of trade and 
economic cooperation agreements with other Caribbean countries was seen as a better 
approach than membership in CARICOM.
4 
 
                                                 
3 West Indian Commission, “Time For Action-The Report of The West Indian Commission”, Black Rock, 
Barbados, 1992. 
4  The CARICOM concentric approach tended to over-emphasize smallness to the detriment of the 
importance of a stronger Caribbean community. It focused too much on physical size of population and 
territory without taking into consideration other factors such as culture, collective negotiating power, level 
of development, regional and hemispheric geopolitical balance, etc.  It changed somewhat over time as 
indicated in the willingness of CARICOM to consider membership for Haiti as well as  for other 
previously-defined “large”  Caribbean countries. See Gonzales, Anthony. “CARICOM and Convergence 
with Hemispheric Integration” Mimeo. Paper presented to the Third Annual Global  Development 
Conference  held in Rio de Janeiro from  9 to 14  December 2001. 
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 In the eyes of the West Indian Commission, the first concentric circle was 
CARICOM comprising the small countries in the Caribbean. Full entry into CARICOM, 
as exemplified in the case of Suriname, illustrated this approach. 
 
The next outer ring embraced the other Caribbean countries and the CACM. In 
approaching the developing countries of the hemisphere, CARICOM essentially targeted 
the wider Caribbean Basin countries. In 1996 CARICOM agreed to give priority to 
negotiating free trade agreements with Colombia, the Dominican Republic, the Central 
American Common Market (or Costa Rica) and Venezuela.
5  
 
CARICOM also adopted a model approach in negotiating trade and economic 
agreements with non-CARICOM countries of the hemisphere. It stipulated that 
reciprocity will be given by the MDCs
6 of CARICOM and non-reciprocity should be 
negotiated for the LDCs
7 of CARICOM. 
 
As regards the rest of the hemisphere (NAFTA and MERCOSUR), which was 
regarded as the third outer ring, CARICOM agreed in the above-mentioned decision that 
interest in entering into trade arrangements with MERCOSUR should be signaled. It 
however, did not state clearly the nature (reciprocal or non-reciprocal) of such 
agreements. The implication however, seemed to be an expectation that with such large 
countries and trade blocs as MERCOSUR and NAFTA, trade agreements should be non-
reciprocal. CARICOM already enjoys non-reciprocal trading arrangements with the 
developed counties (Canada and the United States) in the hemisphere in the form of 
CARIBCAN and CBI. 
 
Since the 1996 CARICOM decision on regional trade negotiations, CARICOM 
has concluded negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the Dominican 
Republic
8 and a Partial Scope Agreement with Cuba.
9 It has also negotiated an 
Agreement on Trade and Technical Cooperation with the Government of the Republic of 
Colombia as well as a CARICOM-Venezuela Trade and Investment Agreement. 
 
In terms of special and differential treatment, the CARICOM/Cuba Agreement 
takes into consideration the differences in the levels of development between Cuba and 
the LDCs of CARICOM in the implementation of a programme of trade liberalisation 
between the Parties. The basic Agreement between CARICOM and the Dominican 
Republic is based on reciprocity with the five CARICOM MDCs and non-reciprocity 
with the LDCs until the year 2005. The CARICOM-Venezuela Trade and Investment 
Agreement is a one-way preferential agreement concluded under the facility for non-
                                                 
5 At its Seventeenth Meeting held in Barbados in July 1996, the Conference of Heads of Government. 
6 In CARICOM, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago are defined as More 
Developed Countries (MDCs). 
7 CARICOM LDCs are Belize, Grenada, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica, Antigua 
and Barbuda, St. Kitts/Nevis, and Montserrat. 
8 This Agreement has entered into force between the Dominican Republic and two CARICOM countries 
(Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago) from the 1
st    December 2001. 
9 The Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the Caribbean Community and the 
Government of the Republic of Cuba was signed on 5 July 2000. 
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 reciprocal partial scope agreements available to members of the Latin American 
Integration Association (ALADI). Duty-free or duty-reduced access to the Venezuelan 
market for identified CARICOM products is provided.
10 
 
The CARICOM/Colombia Agreement began as a non-reciprocal agreement but 
had to provide for a level of reciprocity to Colombia after a period of four years. It makes 
provision for the four CARICOM MDCs to grant duty-free or duty-reduced treatment to 
identified products from Colombia, while Colombia provides similar treatment to a 
different and additional set of identified products from all CARICOM Member States.
11 
MFN treatment applies with respect to other products. The CARICOM LDCs will 
continue to enjoy the benefit of preference for their exports which qualify without having 
to reciprocate. 
 
A significant feature of all of the reciprocal trade arrangements that CARICOM 
has concluded is that the Less Developed Countries (OECS
12 and Belize) are not required 
to grant tariff concessions to imports from these third parties. These agreements with 
Venezuela, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Colombia have set the stage for future 
trade talks with the rest of the region. 
 
 
CARICOM’S Small Economies Approach in the FTAA and WTO 
 
CARICOM countries are looking towards hemispheric integration to provide workable 
solutions to their adjustment to a world driven by globalization and liberalization, and in 
which there will be little or no place for special preferences in the future. It is useful to 
recall that CARICOM, relatively more than most, if not, all regions, has enjoyed sizeable 
non-reciprocal preferences over the last 25 years that has allowed it to continue the 
production of high-cost basic agricultural commodities.  
 
The abrupt elimination of these preferences would now spell severe labour 
disruption and possibly even ethnic strife for certain CARICOM members. For 
economies that have enjoyed such high protection in developed country markets, the 
adjustment and transitional costs are high, not only in the economic equation, but also in 
political and social terms. Coupled with such risks are the natural barriers that these states 
face and which are linked to their small size. These relate essentially to the relatively 
higher transport costs that stem from small volumes; higher per capita utility costs 
associated with lack of scale and indivisibilities; the greater difficulties inherent in 
diversification due to narrow specialization and small markets; the higher transaction 
costs that face their small firms in entering foreign markets in areas such as acquiring 
marketing information, penetrating distribution networks, etc; the disproportionate impact 
                                                 
10 Venezuela has since requested the same preferential tariffs that were granted to Colombia by the 
CARICOM MDCs as soon as possible. 
11 The exceptions were the Bahamas which was not a party to the Agreement, and Suriname which was not 
a member of CARICOM when the Agreement was concluded.   
12 The OECS countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St Kitts/Nevis, St Lucia, 
and St Vincent and the Grenadines. The British Virgin Islands and Anguilla are Associate Members. 
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 of natural disasters, and the binding constraints of limited technical and administrative 
capacity. These bottlenecks do not necessarily condemn small states to be less developed 
than large ones. They do, however, involve different risks and call for policies 
appropriate to these states.
13 
 
An FTAA that focuses mainly on reducing trade barriers and harmonizing 
regulations would leave these problems untouched. Rather, it would focus on securing 
national advantages in other markets. The natural constraints faced by small states would 
remain and not be addressed. It is for this reason that CARICOM sees formal market 
integration as a priority for further development. 
 
While the above perspectives have no doubt conditioned CARICOM’s attitude 
toward the FTAA, the structural factors at work should not be ignored.  CARICOM 
exhibits a slow and uneven pace of trade and investment integration in the hemisphere. 
While it is clear in terms of trade intensity that CARICOM’s trade with the hemisphere is 
growing faster than its trade with other destinations, the rate of such growth and its high 
concentration on one or two countries does not facilitate the evolution of a strong 
consensus in favour of more policies to intensify that trade. Evidence of the latter is 
visible in the small number of Free Trade Agreements and Partial Scope arrangements 
entered into by CARICOM as compared to other regions and countries. 
 
The slow pace of deepening CARICOM is another factor that is not conducive to 
its widening. Its proposed Single Market and Economy lacks depth as seen in the 
significant divergence between the proposed FTAA and the present state of integration in 
CARICOM. If one compares the nine negotiating areas in the FTAA with what pertains 
to CARICOM, it becomes clear that for seven of these areas, the internal arrangements in 
CARICOM are either non-existent, rudimentary, or in an embryonic stage. The latter are 
services, government procurement, competition policy, intellectual property rights, 
investment, subsidies and anti-dumping and countervailing measures, and dispute 
settlement. The proposed FTAA therefore far outstrips CARICOM in terms of a 
harmonized policy area and this may even be so if one were to accept that CARICOM 
has a common external tariff (more uncommon in many ways) and has some history of a 
community in terms of functional cooperation  and people-to-people collaboration. 
 
In making the above structural comparisons, it is important not to neglect the 
process criteria that have affected CARICOM’s vision of the FTAA.  CARICOM’s 
outlook of the FTAA has been governed by the lack of progress on its proposals 
regarding smaller economies presented to the FTAA.  In spite of the San Jose Declaration 
of 1998, the Miami Declaration of 1995, and the Toronto Declaration of 1999, all of 
which entailed commitments to take into account the development and size of economies, 
no meaningful progress has been made beyond some consensus regarding the need for 
technical assistance. The CARICOM states are still hoping that in the coming months, as 
the FTAA process enters a more substantive phase, that the issue of special and 
differential treatment will be finally addressed. There is growing consensus about the 
                                                 
13 World Bank/Commonwealth Secretariat. “Small States: Meeting Challenges in  the Global Economy.”  
March 2000. 
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 need to start examining eligibility criteria. This is a positive sign but it must be equally 
matched by the identification of relevant provisions that would meet the demands of 
these states. 
 
CARICOM is also pursuing the above development agenda in the WTO and the 
upcoming negotiations between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) states.  CARICOM has always been concerned with the extent to which 
the Marrakesh agreement did not take into account the conditions of small states. The 
experience with the WTO panel on bananas has led the small banana-producing 
CARICOM countries to question the degree to which the WTO appreciates the 
commodity dependence of some of these countries, and whether a case cannot be made 
for a waiver or some positive discrimination among developing countries in favor of  
such small vulnerable economies. 
 
CARICOM countries have been pressing especially for recognition of the needs 
and concerns of small economies, trying to adopt a work programme on smaller 
economies within the WTO; the operationalisation of special and differential treatment 
for developing countries and the need to make it binding; the adoption of a development 
driven work programme; as well as the need for greater internal transparency in WTO 
decision-making.
14  
 
Currently, in the WTO, small developing states are covered by provisions for 
special and differential treatment that apply to developing countries as a whole. In all, the 
various texts contain 72 of the 97 different provisions of special and differential treatment 
related to developing members as a group. The conceptual basis for their inclusion lies in 
the observation that these countries suffer from intrinsic disadvantages and that trade 
policies for sustainable development in these countries are different. 
 
According to GATT 94, these provisions can be classified into five main groups: 
provisions aimed at increasing trade opportunities through market access; provisions 
requiring WTO members to safeguard the interest of developing countries; provisions 
allowing flexibility to developing countries in rules and disciplines governing trade 
measures; provisions allowing longer transitional periods to developing countries; and 
provisions for technical assistance.
15 
 
The main issue for CARICOM countries is whether another category of 
vulnerable countries can be created with a package of special and differential measures 
that are less than that for the LLDCs
16  but meet the needs of these countries with 
treatment that is transitional rather than permanent.
17 This issue is fundamental and 
involves the restructuring of the present system of classification as well as changing the 
criteria for differentiation and graduation among developing countries.  
                                                 
14 RNM UPDATE Special Issue:  The Fourth WTO Ministerial  Part 1  November 23, 2001.  
15 Additional provisions within these five groups relate specifically to the least-developed countries. 
16 Least Developed Countries (LLDCs) as defined by the UN and recognized by the WTO. 
17  WTO.  Concerns and Problems of Small Economies.  Joint Paper By Barbados, Jamaica, Lesotho, 
Mauritius, Sri Lanka And Trinidad and Tobago WT/COMTD/W/50/   2 December 1998. 
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At Doha, some progress on small economies was made in terms of procedure. It 
was agreed to establish a work programme on small economies under the auspices of the 
General Council to examine issues relating to the trade of small economies. “The 
objective of this work is to frame responses to the trade-related issues identified for the 
fuller integration of small, vulnerable economies into the multilateral trading system, and 
not to create a sub-category of WTO members.”
18 In addition, recently in the Doha WTO 
Ministerial  Declaration, agreement was reached “to review all special and differential 
treatment with a view to strengthening them and making them  more precise, effective 
and operational”. The latter opens up the possibility for a new WTO framework of 
Special and Differential Treatment more in line with the development needs of particular 
groups of developing countries. 
 
In conclusion, CARICOM states find it difficult to accept that they must be 
fatalistically pragmatic as small states and adjust to regional and multilateral 
liberalization at any cost. They have adopted a defensive posture and are examining their 
options on all fronts. Their unfinished agenda remains essentially one of pursuing special 
and differential treatment that would enable them to meet their obligations and not 
conflict with their own regional arrangements. 
 
 
Major Challenges to CARICOM in ACP/EU Trade Negotiations 
 
The new ACP-EU Partnership Agreement establishes a framework that pursues trade 
liberalization between the parties and offers provisions in the area of trade-related 
matters. This framework agreement covers 20 years, and in 2002, a formal negotiation 
period of 6 years will be opened. Existing preferences will be continued for a preparatory 
period of 8 years until 2007, after which individually or collectively for the ACP 
countries, a new trade regime is expected to be in place that would either be a Free Trade 
Area (FTA) in the form of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) which would have 
a transition period of 10 or 12 years up to 2018 or 2020; or the GSP or some other 
alternative to be determined. Since both parties agreed “to remove progressively barriers 
to trade” between them, there is already some commitment to reciprocity in an EPA for 
the ACP non-LLDCs who choose to do so. This EPA will be WTO-compatible and cover 
“essentially all trade” and be implemented within 10 to 12 years. ACP countries are 
invited to sign up as groups, building on their own regional integration schemes. For 
countries not wishing to enter EPAs, alternative arrangements will be examined that are 
WTO-compatible and provide a level of market access equivalent to current preferences.  
ACP Least Developed (LLDCs) are guaranteed free access to the EU market for 
essentially all their products. Such liberalisation would start in parallel in 2000 for almost 
all imports from all LLDCs and on the basis of GSP be completed by the year 2005, at 
the latest on a non-reciprocal basis.
19 The current all-ACP non-reciprocal tariff 
preferences are maintained until December 21, 2007.  
                                                 
18 The General Council shall review the work programme and make recommendations for action to the 
Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/ 
19  The European Union recently granted an “everything–except-arms”  GSP treatment for all ACP and 
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   Formal negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements will start by September 
2002 at the latest and in 2004, the situation of non-LLDC ACP countries not in a position 
to enter into EPAs will be assessed and alternative possibilities considered. The progress 
in the negotiation of EPAs will be assessed and new trading arrangements will enter into 
force by January 1, 2008 at the latest. Liberalisation of trade will begin by 2008, at the 
latest and have a transitional period of at least 12 years. 
 
The EU agreements with ACP countries have given Caribbean countries non-
reciprocal duty free access to the EU market for most products.  In addition preferential 
access is provided under various commodity protocols for ACP countries.  Commodity 
protocols for sugar, rum, rice and bananas provide preferential access in terms of quota 
and higher than world market prices.  In view of the new arrangements that emerged  at 
the end of the Uruguay Round, a new framework for trade between the ACP and the 
European Union became necessary as a result of the difficulty of maintaining special 
non-reciprocal trade preferences for a select group of developing countries. 
 
Cotonou trade preferences discriminate between ACP and non-ACP countries of 
similar levels of development. WTO rules, under the Enabling Clause, allow developing 
countries to be exempted from the principle of non-discrimination (also referred to as the 
MFN principle, spelled out in Article 1 of GATT), but only if they are all treated the 
same, as in the GSP which is compatible under the Enabling Clause (adopted for an 
indefinite period). This discriminating policy has been able to survive until now only by 
means of a waiver but this waiver has now become difficult, if not impossible, to obtain 
in the WTO. 
 
As regards the negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), it is the 
EU intention to request reciprocity individually or from all members of an ACP sub-
region (including LLDCs that wish to accept an EPA) either already applying free trade 
effectively or planning to introduce free trade and which elects itself for such negotiation. 
This may, in particular, be the case in custom unions or (completed) free trade areas 
among ACP states. 
 
  The CARICOM Treaty, as modified by Protocols II to IX, is built on the 
assumption that commitments in multilateral and bilateral agreements will never provide 
superior conditions to nationals of third countries or to goods and services of such 
countries than is provided to nationals of states of the CSME.  CARICOM has been able 
to structure provisions in the CSME, giving more favourable conditions to goods, 
services and nationals of member states than to similar goods, services or nationals of 
third countries, by virtue of exceptions built into the Agreements with third parties or 
provided for in international agreements such as the Marrakesh Agreement. The 
exemptions are permitted on the basis of agreed conditions. These conditions are 
however not static. Trade agreements are negotiated and re-negotiated from time to time. 
The latter is the case in future ACP/EU negotiations since the coherence of CARICOM  
and its CSME may be threatened. The  OECS  CARICOM States have already indicated 
                                                                                                                                                 
non-ACP LLDCs. 
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 a strong interest in non-reciprocity in trading relations even though by EU criteria they 
are not LLDCs.  Haiti would qualify for non-reciprocal treatment by the European Union. 
Some other CARICOM countries might opt for the GSP, while the rest may wish for a 
full-fledged FTA, although on some asymmetrical terms.  
 
  It may be difficult to reconcile these different approaches with the notion of a 
single market and economy. Two (or three) sets of trade arrangements within one region, 
i.e. one maintaining non-reciprocal preferences, while the other engaging in EPAs, could 
be a setback for regional integration in CARICOM. The maintenance of an autonomous  
regional  integration process  is important for CARICOM. Assurance is therefore needed 
that CARICOM members can continue to honour the full range of commitments, 
obligations and undertakings in Protocols II to IX and this will depend on the outcomes 
of these negotiations.  
  
  According to Art. 36.1 of the Cotonou Agreement, the ACP and European Union 
agreed “to conclude new World Trade Organization (WTO) compatible trading 
arrangements”. This implies that by the end of 2007 or any other agreed time, the ACP 
and European Union must conclude trading arrangements that must be compatible with 
whatever changes may have taken place in the WTO. 
  
  Under Article XXIV of the WTO, free trade area agreements are a permitted 
exception to the basic principle of most-favoured nation treatment. Article XXIV allows 
for a degree of asymmetry in liberalisation in the formation of FTAs. In particular, to be 
WTO compatible, FTAs must fully liberalise “substantially all trade” between the 
signatories, i.e. there should not be too many sensitive products excluded from the 
agreement. Also this liberalisation must take place “within a reasonable period of time,” 
now defined in the WTO as a period that “should exceed ten years only in exceptional 
cases.” 
  
WTO compatibility remains controversial since both conditions are subject to a 
certain degree of interpretation. The interpretation of the “substantially-all-trade” 
requirement continues to be a contentious issue. Discussions in GATT working parties 
reflect two basic positions. Some understand the “substantially-all-trade” requirement in 
qualitative terms, that is, free trade areas cannot exclude major sectors from intra-
regional liberalization. Others give the requirement a quantitative perspective. They 
demand that a substantial percentage of intra-regional trade must be covered by the free 
trade area agreement, rather than substantially all products or sectors. Recently in the 
EU/South Africa Agreement the latter quantitative criterion was used. It established the 
framework for a reciprocal, but asymmetrical FTA, that will cover 90% of bilateral trade 
by value over a reference period (1994-1996). 
 
  The ACP countries have expressed concern with the limited flexibility under Art. 
XXIV and the uncertainty surrounding the legal interpretation of its provisions. They 
would wish to see more flexibility introduced on a sounder legal basis in terms of 
transition periods and the exclusion of sensitive sectors, particularly for the least 
developed, small and landlocked countries. In the  DOHA WTO Ministerial  Declaration, 
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 they managed to obtain  agreement for  negotiations aimed at “ clarifying and improving 
disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO provisions applying to regional trade 
agreements. The negotiations shall take into account the developmental aspects of 
regional trade agreements”. The latter talks will be crucial for CARICOM in its search 
for more flexibility under Art. XXIV.  
 
There are also several implications for Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
negotiations some of which are, like those for post-Cotonou, tied up in the WTO.  A 
major one is the scope for manoeuvre with the trade regime and the recognition that 
whatever is decided in the FTAA or post-Contonou context must respect the principle of 
non-discrimination in tariff treatment by the Caribbean ACPs between the European 
Union and North America. Different timetables in FTAA, WTO and ACP/European 
Union tend to compound the difficulties. At present, the FTAA is carded for completion 
by December 2004. Any agreement that is not favourable to small economies and is less 
than the outcomes of  WTO and ACP/EU deliberations on S&D and small countries 
could be damaging for CARICOM countries. 
    
The task therefore, for CARICOM states is to find the optimum sequencing and 
timing of negotiating events that would ensure maximization of interests across all three 
forum. It is a difficult one for such small states that largely do not control the negotiating 
timetables and agendas.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Caribbean countries have been preoccupied with certain trends in the international 
environment that are perceived as having a negative impact on small economies. They 
tend to underscore the erosion of trade preferences under special trading arrangements 
such as the CBI, Cotonou, GSP and CARIBCAN as a result of universal and regional 
liberalization; reciprocity in trade between developed and developing countries; 
difficulties for small countries to attract investment outside the natural resource sector 
since small market size if not offset by substantial geographical advantages in skill, 
infrastructure, low wage cost, etc. is not conducive to attracting investment; intense 
competition to attract foreign investors leading to more and more incentives and greater  
resources for investment promotion; and the concentration of international investment in 
a few countries as evidenced by the increasing attractiveness of trade blocks for 
investment. 
 
CARICOM is particularly concerned that the negative effects of such world 
integration will produce the marginalization of the region in the globalization process. 
Caribbean countries see themselves as having to integrate too fast into the world 
economy and make significant policy changes at the macro-economic and structural 
levels in order to reap benefits from the liberalization of trade either at the multilateral 
and /or regional level. Such policy changes involve high adjustment costs in the short run.  
Efforts at diversification and adaptation to the above changes have not been facilitated by 
the above trends in investment. 
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The above poses a challenge to EU/Caribbean relations in the future. The task is 
to ensure that developments arising from globalisation do not aggravate or create 
inequalities in societies and between regions. It is to that end that a new partnership with 
the European Union must address itself. 
  
    Unlike Mexico, MERCOSUR and Chile which have opted for a Free Trade Area 
(FTA) with the European Union, CARICOM is still weighing its trade integration options 
with the European Union. Its concern is whether a WTO-compatible EPA will allow the 
desired flexibility and would take sufficient account of the effects of vulnerability. A 
WTO-compatible EPA is therefore seen as beyond their reach unless Art. XXIV is 
substantially reformed and/or flexibly interpreted. 
 
The commitments, obligations and undertakings within the CSME are being 
developed in the context of a multilateral environment in which member states have 
increasingly binding obligations and commitments; an increasing number of bilateral and 
multilateral agreements with binding commitments; and regional agreements being 
subjected to rigorous WTO scrutiny and rules. A major challenge to CARICOM 
therefore, is to ensure that treatment in agreements with third parties such as the 
European Union does not undermine the desirable margin of preference for CARICOM 
producers, and at worst, is not more favourable than the treatment given in the CSME. 
The granting of reciprocity will no doubt lower the ability to give preferential treatment 
to CARICOM nationals but in the context of open regionalism, the granting of protection 
and incentives, especially in a small integration movement, should be tempered with 
moderation and a concern to introduce  international competition without excessive 
delay. 
 
Finally, reconciling the preferences to the European Union with those under the 
FTAA and vice versa is problematic. It involves timing and sequencing of negotiations in 
such a way as to ensure minimal costs and maximum benefits in the granting of trade 
concessions. The over-arching role of the WTO will no doubt set the framework and 
must enter into the equation from the outset. The search for WTO compatibility and 
consistency across agreements will be therefore, taxing. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Abbreviations 
 
ACP- African, Pacific and Caribbean 
ACS- Association of Caribbean States 
ALADI-  Latin American Integration Association (LAIA- English Acronym) 
CARICOM-  Caribbean Community  
CARIFTA- Caribbean Free Trade Association  
CBI- Caribbean Basin Initiative 
CET- Common External Tariff  
CSME- CARICOM Single Market and Economy 
DR- Dominican Republic 
EBA- Everything-But-Arms 
EPA- Economic Partnership Agreement 
EU-  European Union  
FTA- Free Trade Area or Free Trade Agreement 
FTAA-  Free Trade Area of the Americas  
GATS- General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GATT- General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 
GSP- Generalized Scheme of Preferences 
IDB- Inter-American Development Bank 
LDC- Less Developed Country 
LLDC- Least Developed Country 
MDC- More Developed Country 
MERCOSUR- Southern Cone Common Market 
MFN- Most Favoured Nation 
NAFTA- North American free Trade Area 
OAS- Organization of American States 
OECS- Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
OSM-  OECS Single Market  
RNM- Regional Negotiating Machinery 
WTO- World Trade Organization 
UWI-University of the West Indies 
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